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Abstract – This paper examines the phenomenon of the underground economy.  We
analyze the choice by firms and workers to carry out their economic activities within the
formal economy context (regular economy) or the underground economy context (irregular
economy). We assume that there are two types of labor markets, a regular one, and a irregular
one; and starting from a coordinated interaction between the firm and the worker we show the
existence  of  multiple  symmetric  equilibria  in  each  market.  The  proposed  game  of
coordination (2x2), can be interpreted as a pre-contract interaction between the agents through
which they determine in which labor market they will “meet”. In the model, we insert an
exogenous policy parameter (t) that measures the impact of legislative policy interventions on
the regular labor market. The parameter takes on a positive value with respect to those
interventions that increase the incentives to operate in the regular market. Through the
utilization of evolutionary dynamics we can explicate the mechanism that leads the system
towards one of the two equilibria, and explain the fact that these equilibria are sustained
among the different populations (firms and workers) by taking on the role of a social norm.
In this framework, we show that policy interventions (t) do not alter the choice dynamics of
each actor, nor do they eliminate the probability of having certain dynamics that push the
system towards the underground market, even where there are strong incentives for acting in
the regular economy.
Key Words – Underground labor market; social norms; evolutionary game; policy
incentives.
JEL Classification – J41; J42; O17; Z131.  Introduction
A large portion of empirical research
1 on the underground economy in Italy has
highlighted the local, even district-level, occurrence of this phenomenon.
The localized nature of the Italian underground economy has imposed the need for a
more in-depth study of those social relations that define, and thus differentiate, those
contexts that are most conducive to the creation of a underground labor market
economy.  In economics studies
2, labor market analysis has often referred us to the
impact of social norms on the choices of firms and workers.  Researchers have used
the existence of social norms to explain a number of economic behaviors, including
the greater commitment of some workers with respect to others, the absence of
competition for wages between employed and unemployed workers, the granting, by
many firms, of minimum wages whose value is higher than real productivity, etc…
In this economics literature, little attention has been paid to the role that social norms
have in explaining the existence of underground economic activities, and to the
influence  that  social  norms  have  on  the  choices  of  economic  agents.   The
quantitatively most relevant strand of research on the underground economy has
pointed at institutional factors, namely taxation and regulation, as main determinants
of firms’ behavior in choosing between regularity or irregularity
3.
Through this work I will propose an analysis of the underground economy that lies on
interactions within the labor market, making it explicit how the existence of social
norms determines the agents’ choice to act in irregular ways even where there are
policy incentives for regular economic activity.
We assume the existence of two types of labor markets, a regular one and a sunk one;
firms and workers have to choose in which market they are willing to, respectively,
demand and supply labor.   The condition faced by firms is to perform a regular
activity of production and distribution of licit goods, while they have option to use
either regular or irregular labor force for such activities.  At the same time, workers
can choose to offer labor either in the regular or in the irregular market. There is thus
a sort of pre-contract interaction through which firms and workers have to decide in
which of the two markets they will meet, and eventually, perform their activity.
The argument that I will support, is that the choice to resort to the sunk market is
sustained, at least partially, by a social norm.  A social norm regulates the behavior
and expectations of a group of individuals; we expect that others comply with the
norm and, similarly, we expect others to expect that we comply.  For the same reason,
the choice to “meet” in the irregular labor market is based on behavioral rules that are
recognized and respected by all the agents that are part of the group
4.  Any type of
market, be it a regular or an underground market, is based on a set of shared norms
which are, in turn, the result of a learning process that develops through time in a
given framework of interaction between the agents.
A social norm can be the result of interactions within a small group of
individuals, and be subsequently extended to a larger population through a mechanism
of learning/emulation.
                                                   
1 Baculo [1998], Censis[2002] and many papers of the “Comitato per l’emersione del lavoro non
regolare” in the site www.emersionelavorononregolare.it.
2 Akerlof [1980], Fehr and others [1998], Huck, Kubler, Weibull [2003].
3 A rich and  well-documented survey of this literature is available in Schneider [2000].
4 The studies carried out in this field have clearly highlighted this characteristic. The entrepreneurs
facing the possibility to emerge have manifested “ the fear of a break of the subtle existing equilibria
among the parts, that have been created with difficulty, although illegally” Liberti [2001].Definition – A social norm exists in a given framework if a group of individuals
behaves regularly in a certain way and those who deviate from that behavior are
punished (support costs)
5 .
The analysis that I am suggesting is in line with that large portion of literature
6
that explains the emergence of norms and conventions through the use of evolutionary
dynamics applied to the games of coordination.   Such games are characterized by
multiple equilibria that face players with the problem of coordinating their choices;  in
this respect it is possible to view these equilibria as norms.
As such, social norms can be reduced to individual choice functions within a double
interaction mechanism: that of strategic interaction between firms and workers, and
that of  parametric interaction between each player and the surrounding environment
(state of the game).
The type of game on which the model rests is based on the symmetric
interaction between the firm and the worker that determines two pure strategy Nash
equilibria, one in the regular labor market, and the other in the underground market.
The firm prefers the underground market equilibrium, while the worker prefers that of
the regular market; this introduces an asymmetry in the positions of the two players
that does not alter the structure of the game but implies a substantial differentiation of
the incentives between labor demand and labor supply.   The two equilibria are
equivalent except for a parameter   t that represents policy interventions aimed at
increasing the incentives for regular labor market activity.
The  possibility  of  a  regulatory  intervention  introduces  in  the  model  a
normative-type level of analysis.  We place the attention on those policies that combat
the spread of an underground economy which have recently become a priority on the
national and European policy agendas;  and like these, they have often been faced
with a cultural and economic environment that has, in most instances, rejected them.
The objective of this paper, is to demonstrate how the legislative interventions
aimed at the emergence of the black labor, take place in a context where the choice to
operate in the underground market is strongly affected by the existence of social
norms.
One aspect that is often cited in many research studies, though a hard one to
define in terms of policies evaluation, is the role and weight of the social context in
the birth and diffusion of black labor.  In this respect, the model develops a criterion
for evaluating the influence of the context – defined through the predominance of
certain behavioral norms – as compared to that of a policy intervention that directly
alters the incentives structure of the regular market.
As we will demonstrate later, the result of the effect of social norms on policy
will be to reduce its efficacy, thus confirming a known finding of recent policy
evaluations, that even in the presence of tight policies to limit the spread of the sunk
economy, there still is the possibility for the system to remain in equilibrium in the
underground labor market.
                                                   
5 Axelrod [1986].
6 Young [1993], Sugden [1989].2.  The game of coordination (2x2)
In the first place, we need to define the structure of interaction on which the model
rests; to that effect, we consider a pure coordination game with two players G={F,
W}, in two strategies N={R, S}, as shown in fig.1.
The  game  represents  a  single-shot  interaction,  with  no  possibility for
communication between the firm C and the worker W, whereby the players chose in
which labor market to operate.
They choose to respectively demand and supply labor in the regular market
(R) or in the underground market (S). The players cannot communicate with each





¬, f  (ni n i-1) Œ {a, b} with  a>b>0  associated to each combination of
choices.
The interaction determines two Nash equilibria in pure strategies (R, R) and (S,
S) in which the worker and the firm make the same choice (in coordination).
The  payoff  structure of  the  regular  market  equilibrium  includes  an  exogenous
parameter t that measures the cumulative impact of policy on the choice to operate in
the regular market.  We assume that the impact of such policies is evenly distributed
between the payoffs of the two players by a ratio of (t/2), for all positive values
between [ 0, +∞].  The parameter t may take on positive values when associated to
policy interventions that increase the incentives (payoff) to choose the regular market.
For  t  =  0  (absence  of  policy),  the  two  strict  Nash Equilibria (NE) are
symmetrical in aggregate payoff terms, and perfectly equivalent in terms of Pareto-
efficiency;  on  the  other  hand  the  individual  payoffs  of  the  two  players  are
asymmetrical when the firm prefers the underground market while the worker prefers
the regular market.  For both players, however, it would be preferable to coordinate
and choose one of the two equilibria.
In similar situations, it is likely that both the firm and the worker decide to
resort to a casual choice mechanism. In fact, besides the two strict NE, the game
allows for an additional equilibrium in mixed strategies ∆S* = (p*, q*) where the
worker  and  the  firm  define  a  set  of  probability  vectors  si={p1,p2….pn}  and
                         C
         R           S
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               R               b+(t/2)                0
   
    W    
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Fig. 1sL={q1,q2,…qL} with Âp=1 and Âq=1 to assign to the pure strategies of the other
player.   For N=2 pure strategies available, the firm C chooses market R with
probability p and market S with probability 1-p; the worker W chooses the regular
market R with probability q and the irregular market S with probability 1-q.
Through the use of an evolutionary model, I will develop the analysis by showing
that it is possible to reach a Nash equilibrium, and that once this is extended to the
respective populations it becomes a customary behavioral rule that works in the same
direction of a social norm
7.
3.  Evolutionary Analysis
The relevance of social relations structures, and of the role and weight of the
cultural environment in the birth and spread of the underground economy has often
been acknowledged.  The major difficulty has often been represented by the lack of
criteria and instruments to measure the influence of the external environment on the
choices of individuals.  Some suggestions have been advanced to classify types of
environments, resorting to concepts such as “Mediterranean character”  to indicate the
social predominance of a behaviors associated with cultural backwardness, tolerance
of illegality, anti-state attitudes, etc… Thus the necessity to develop a theoretical-
methodological  approach  that  explains  the  origin  and  perpetuation  of  certain
behaviors that, in aggregate form, define the very properties of the social context to
which they belong.
The evolutionary analysis applied to game theory provides a solid instrument
to formalize the dynamic process which through the micro interaction between
individual choices determines the characteristics of the external environment.
Along the lines of the model developed by Maynard Smith J. [1982] in
biological research, the fundamental idea of evolutionary games lies in a repeated and
anonymous interaction between players from the two populations; the strategies with
higher payoffs will substitute the lower-performing ones.  This dynamic process will
move the system towards an evolutionarily stable equilibrium, where any player that
strays from the equilibrium strategy will attain a worse payoff.
The  previous  game  structure  (fig.  1)  defines  an  evolutionary  dynamics
between populations C (companies) and W (workers) that interact through time.  At
any  given  time,  each  individual  player  will  encounter  a  state  of  the  game
(environment) that specifies how the different strategies adopted at that time by each
population are distributed, and what are the relative payoffs to each strategy.
I use an asymmetrical evolutionary model with two populations of finite
number, C = {1,2,….n} and W= {1,2,….n} and for each population I assume a set of
pure strategies Nc = {n1, n2…..ni} and Nw = {n1, n2…..nj} con i e j={1,2}.
At any time t={1,2,…n} of the game there will be a certain combination St =
(sc , sw) of strategies used by each population; where sc =(p, 1- p) and sw =(q, 1- q)
                                                   
7 The thesis according to which  an equilibrium can represent a social norm and as that it can coordinate
the actors’ expectations has been developed by a number of authors. See E. Ullmann-Marglit [1977]
and Bicchieri [1990].represent the distribution of strategies employed by the firms (Sc) and by the workers
(Sw) within their respective populations.
I indicate respectively f 
c (ni, sw ) and f 
w(nj, sc ) as the payoff functions (or
fitness functions) of the players in populations C and W.
We will have:
f 
c(n1 , sw) = (b+t/2)q  f 
w(n1 , sc ) =(a+t/2)p
f 
c(n2 , sw) = a (1 – q)  f 
w(n2 , sc ) =b (1 – p)
It is important to note that each player only interacts with the players of the
other population, so that f 
c(ni, sw ) depends exclusively on sw and not on sc.
At this stage, we need to introduce in the model a dynamic adjustment
mechanism that takes into account the aggregate effects of the process. There are
many ways to explicate an evolutionary dynamics
8; for simplicity, I will consider a
given adjustment dynamics that is continuous in time and can be expressed through a
series of differential equations.
I represent the process of change in the distribution of strategies within each
population through the standard replicators dynamic.
p
• = dp/dt = p[ f 
c (ni , sw) – f
 c (s, s)]
q
•  = dq/dt = q[ f 
w(nj , sc ) – f
 w(s, s)]
The difference shown in squared brackets represents the relative payoff; that is
the difference between the payoff of the n




 c(s, s)= p f 
c(n1 , sw ) + (1- p) f 
c(n2 , sw)
f
 w(s, s)= q f 
w(n1 , sc ) + (1- q) f 
w(n2 , sc )
From the replicators equations it is clear that the sign of the variation of
frequencies p and q is directly proportional to the relative payoff.
When p
• > 0 and q
• > 0, there will be a positive variation, that is to say a greater
number of companies and workers will chose the regular strategy (R).
When p
• <0 and q
• <0 the variation will be negative, the number of firms and workers
that chose (R) will decrease, and consequently, the number of those who choose (S)
will increase.
When p
• = 0 and q
• = 0  the variation is zero the dynamics stops, and the model
reaches an evolutionary equilibrium
9 (EE), which means that no firm will be better-off
by changing its strategy.
                                                   
8 Friedman [1991],  Hofbauer and Sigmund [1998] and  Gintis [2000] can be referred to for a detailed
analysis.
9  If  s Œ S there is an evolutionary equilibrium ( EE) for the  dynamic F only when  s is a fixed point of
F, thus F(s) = 0, and it is asymptotically stable; that is given the set N Ã S, every initial status inside NIn  the  model,  the  evolutionary  equilibria  that  are  asymptotically  stable
coincide with the strict Nash equilibria (in pure strategies) of the initial game (fig. 1);
the third equilibrium in mixed strategies ∆(S) is not stable due to the dynamics. The
latter  is  not  a  new  finding  in  asymmetrical  evolutionary  models  where  mixed
strategies equilibria are never asymptotically stable under the action of the replicators
dynamic
10.
4.  Dynamics of Strategies
Using a phase diagram I represent the dynamics of the strategies used by the
population, and how these move the system towards one of the two equilibria (EE) at
points S1 (1, 1) and S2 (0, 0).
            q S1(1, 1)
          q
*
S2(0, 0) p






11  of strategies distribution within the populations represent the
borders of the basins of attraction for the EE; they divide the space into four regions.
As the sign of the replicators changes, so do the dynamics of distributions of the
populations.
I examine now the sign of the replicators, beginning with the case where t = 0; i.e.
where there are no policy effects on regular market equilibrium.
                                                                                                                                                     
remains in N and converges asymptotically toward the point s. A point EE is an attractor of the
dynamic F, and the set of points of N Ã S that converge to s, is its basin of attraction.
10 It is demonstrated by one of Selten’s theorems.
11 
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*)1.  Top-left region; where p<p
* e q>q
*.
This situation represents the case where there are many firms that choose the
underground market (S), as opposed to there being many regular workers (R). In this
case the replicators will have the sign p
• > 0 and q
• < 0.  Will have a combined effect
of the dynamics; on the one hand the number of firms that choose the regular market
will increase, while on the other the number of workers in the irregular market will
also increase.  The dynamics will move the system away from this region.
2.  Bottom-right region; where p>p
* and q<q
*.
In this case, contrary to the previous one, there are many firms in the regular market
and many workers in the underground one.  The replicators will have the sign p
•< 0
and q
• > 0.  The dynamics will progressively move the system away from this region,
reducing the number of firms in the regular market and, at the same time, increasing
the number of regular workers.
3.    Top-right region; where p >p
* and q> q
*.
In this situation the majority of firms and workers choose the regular market.  In this
case the replicators will have the same positive sign p
• > 0 and q
• > 0 and will move
the system towards equilibrium S1 (1, 1) in the regular market.
4.    Bottom-left region; where p < p
* and q < q
*.
Both firms and workers increasingly choose the irregular market. The replicators have
negative sign p
• < 0 and q
• < 0 and this will lead the system to converge towards
equilibrium S2 (0, 0) in the irregular labor market.
The analysis conducted thus far allows us to explicate the mechanism of
interaction between demand and supply that explains how the choice to interact in the
regular or in the underground labour market is made and stabilized through time in a
local economy.
Because every equilibrium is based on the coordination of the choices and
expectations of individuals, it takes on the function of a social norm which no one has
deliberately chosen but which is the result of an evolutionary process, characterized
by the cumulative effect of interactions between many individuals in a long-term
dynamics. The model shows that a social norm exists and is necessary to maintain an
equilibrium in both the regular labor market and the underground one.
5.  Policy interventions
Thus far, I have focused the attention on a positive type of analysis, describing
the local process that drives firms and workers to choose the underground labor
market.  In what follows, I will develop the analysis at a normative level, introducing
in the model the effects of policy interventions on the choices of agents throughout
the evolutionary process.
In several instances, both at the national and European level, it has been
highlighted that the main problem associated with the underground economy lies in its
convenience.  It is thus necessary to individuate a strategy that makes it less appealing
for entrepreneurs and workers: the majority of recent policy interventions against the
irregular economy have indeed acted in this direction.The exogenous parameter t that is an element of the game, represents the
impact of legislative policy on regular market equilibrium (R, R).   The policy t
corresponds to positive values that incentive the agents to choose the regular labor
market;  the effects of such policy evenly distributed between the payoffs of workers
and firms by a ratio of t/2.
5.1 Consequences
When t > 0 the effect is to increase the incentive of workers and firms to
choose the regular market (R,R).  We will obtain that the distribution of equilibrium
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decrease, thus narrowing the basin of attraction associated with equilibrium S2 (0, 0)
in the underground market (fig.3).
      q        S1(1, 1)
        q
*
      Ø
      q
*
S2(0, 0)     P
*   ¨  p
* p
(fig.3)
It is important to note that for increasing values of t the levels of strategies
distribution (p
*, q
*) decrease but do not reach zero.  This implies that, even in the
presence of strong incentives (with tÆ+∞) for the emergence of irregular activities
there  will  always  be  an  infinitesimal  probability,  with  positive  value,  for  the






*)What I have just described represents the normative result of the model: it
entails that for any policy intervention there will always be the possibility that the
system converges towards the irregular equilibrium.  If interpreted as an impossibility
element, the result establishes that no exogenous legislative intervention can exclude
an  equilibrium  of  opposite  sign  from  the  same  intervention,  from  the  system
dynamics.
This almost obvious result finds a punctual formal description in the model and
confirms, once again, the requirement to integrate policy interventions the knowledge
about the properties that define the functioning of the social system where one
intervenes.
6.  Considerations
This paper defines a mechanism of interaction that enables us to explain the
formation and perpetuation through time of a social norm that coordinates the agents’
choices  and  keep  the  system  in  the  underground  labor  market.  Through  an
evolutionary model we can represent the process in which groups of workers and
firms manage, by coordinating their behavior, to select the labor market where they
want to bargain.
The attainment of every equilibrium is based on a behavioral rule that works
as a social norm; one that no individual agent has deliberately chosen, but that is the
result of an evolutionary process characterized by the cumulative effect of interactions
between many individuals through a long-term dynamics.
The model demonstrates that a social norm underlies as much the regular labor
market as the irregular market. It is important to highlight that with the same structure
of interaction it is possible to select different social norms for each equilibrium.
The evolution of the system towards one of the equilibria is mainly determined
by the initial state of the game, that is by the distributions of strategies at time t=1.   
Accordingly, the initial state of the game is in turn itself the result of a process of
interaction between the agents at previous times.  The model excludes this backward
looking process that would require assuming the initial state of the game as based
itself on social norms which are in turn the outcome of previous interactions.  In light
of this simplification, it would be more precise to talk about the perpetuation and
strengthening than of the establishment/emergence of social norms that regulate the
labor market.
A further limitation of the model is constituted by the use of a determined and
continuous system of differential equations (replicators dynamic). In fact, the latter
does  not  represent  the  most  adequate  way  to  describe  the  mechanism  of
emulation/transmission of strategies among the populations. This limitation however
can easily be overcome. On the example of Young’s work [1993] it would be useful
to introduce a stochastic dynamics that takes into account the variability of agents’
behavior in reproducing strategies over time.
Finally, it is useful to underline once again the positive-model thrust of the work
that constitutes the initial structure for the analysis of specific, localized, underground
systems  in  light  of  eventual  policy  interventions.  The  underground  economy
phenomenon manifests itself in a multiplicity of ways and it is necessary to take intoaccount the local cost-opportunity conditions in which both firms and workers
operate.  The model, which aims at a theoretical analysis of the phenomenon, reduces
these specificities while focusing on the common properties of interaction between
individual choices and external environment that characterize the various forms of
irregular economies.
7.  Conclusions
This paper responds to the broader requirement to provide a formal representation
of the complex network of social relations through which firms and workers interact,
even in the underground economy level, and that are in turn affected by historic-
cultural variable, such as exchange rules, reciprocity, conventions, habits….
The outcome of the model highlights the two-fold level of analysis applied to the
underground economy: the first level is determined by a self-generating social order
which stems from the interaction, over time, among a large number of agents and that
leads to the establishment of social norms;   the second level is determined by the
fundamental idea of an ordered societal structure that underlies the regulations
implemented  by  policy  interventions.  These  are  two  different  levels  in  which
difference types of rules and/or laws are manifest. The notion that the underground
economy is merely a negative performance of economic activity thus appears to be a
partial one.
The underground is one component of the whole economic system.  Specifically,
it is an economic manifestation based on the plurality of interactions between
individuals that define the cultural, social, and economic context as determinant
variables of the development and existence over time of a sunk economy.
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